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Abstract
We provide a model that rationalizes variations in confidence of rational
agents, both in the time-series and the cross-section. Combining horizon-dependent
risk aversion (“anxiety”) and selective memory, we show that over- and under-
confidence can arise in the Bayesian equilibrium of an intra-personal game. In
the time-series, overconfidence is more prevalent when actual risk levels are
high, while underconfidence occurs when risks are low. In the cross-section,
more anxious agents are more prone to biased confidence and their beliefs fluc-
tuatemore, leading them to buy in booms and sell in crashes. Lastly, fluctuations
in confidence can amplify boom-bust cycles.
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“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you
know for sure that just ain’t so.” — Mark Twain
“[I]t is hard for us with, and without being flippant, to even see a sce-
nario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in
any of those [CDO] transactions.” — Joe Cassano, CFO of AIG’s financial
products unit, in August 2007 (AIG, 2007)
1 Introduction
Excessive risk taking due to biased beliefs is considered a contributing factor to the
recent financial crisis (Barberis, 2013). Interestingly, several outsiders saw the risks
building up while they were taken (e.g., Case and Shiller, 2003; Himmelberg et al.,
2005; Smith and Smith, 2006; Shiller, 2007). At the same time, the decision makers
themselves appeared to underestimate the risks – as evidenced both by public state-
ments as well as personal investment decisions (Cheng et al., 2014; Foote et al., 2012).
Why is it that particular people – specifically, those with access to the best informa-
tion about risk levels and those making the risk-taking decisions – are systematically
the most biased, especially at times when risks are high? Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
and Akerlof and Shiller (2010) advocate that fluctuations in confidence are a nec-
essary part of realistic models of market dynamics and the business cycle. We ask:
Do such fluctuations imply irrational decision makers, or can a neoclassical model
generate such belief dynamics?
We develop a framework that generates overconfidence in equilibrium and that
predicts howoverconfidence varies in the time-series and in the cross-section.Among
the different facets of overconfidence, we focus on overprecision of beliefs, first doc-
umented in the 1969 study of Alpert and Raiffa (1982) and popularized by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974). A recent example in this tradition is the study of Ben-David
et al. (2013) who show thatwhenCFOs are asked to forecast the S&P 500, the realized
one-year return falls within a CFO’s 80-percent confidence interval only 36 percent
of the time.1
1The data in Gennaioli et al. (2015) indicate that the same CFOs displaying overprecision of beliefs
are well-calibrated on average about first moments, i.e. they are not over-optimistic.
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Our model predicts this overprecision of beliefs when actual risk levels are high
such as at the height of booms – but only among agents who face risk-taking deci-
sions and thus have amaterial reason for “motivated beliefs.” Conversely, our model
generates underconfidence among such agents when actual risk levels are low. The
model is thus able to explain why, which, and when decision makers in the recent
financial crisis appear to have been the most overconfident, and why the confidence
level of these agents fluctuates over the market cycle.
How can a rational Bayesian agent have mis-calibrated beliefs? Motivated by em-
pirical evidence linking “anxiety” with belief manipulation, we show that an agent’s
overconfidence arises endogenously when combining a “demand” for overconfi-
dence due to dynamically inconsistent risk preferences, and a need to make risk-
taking decisions with a “supply” of overconfidence via motivated information pro-
cessing. On the “demand” side, we stay within the standard paradigm of expected
utility but assume that the agent exhibits horizon-dependent risk aversion as introduced
by Eisenbach and Schmalz (2016). Specifically, we assume that risk aversion is higher
for imminent than for distant risks, which we refer to as “anxiety.” Such preferences
have beendocumented experimentally as early as Jones and Johnson (1973)whohave
subjects participate in a simulated medical trial. Subjects are told that the probabil-
ity of experiencing unpleasant side effects increases with the dosage they choose, as
does the monetary compensation they receive – a classic risk-return tradeoff. Sub-
jects choose smaller dosages – implying higher risk aversion – when they are to take
the drug immediately than when they are to take it the next day.2
The key implication of horizon-dependent risk aversion is that agents would like
to take more risks in the future but end up backing out as the risks approach. This
dynamic inconsistency implies that an agent’s earlier self would like to manipulate
a later self to take more risk than the later self will be inclined to take on its own. We
investigate whether belief manipulation can help align the later self’s actions with
the earlier self’s preferences in situations in which external commitment devices are
either unavailable, relatively costly, or less attractive than overconfidence for other
2In Section 2, we discuss numerous studies which find the same pattern using standard experi-
mental economics designs with monetary payoffs and rigorous elicitation of risk aversion (Onculer,
2000; Sagristano et al., 2002; Noussair and Wu, 2006; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Coble and Lusk,
2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011).
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exogenous reasons.3
We find that the internal disagreement about risk taking implies that the earlier
self wants to convince the later self that risks are lower than they actually are. If
successful, such self-manipulation leads to overly precise beliefs of the later self. As
a result, the later self makes decisions that are riskier and more aligned with the
earlier self’s preferences, compared to the decisions it would have taken under well-
calibrated beliefs. The question is then how such a demand for overconfidence can
be met and sustained in equilibrium.
The “supply” side of themodel addresses the question of how an early self can af-
fect the beliefs of a later self. We take a conservative approach by assuming the belief
manipulation happens indirectly through selective memory. The idea that humans
display a tendency to selectively forget goes back at least to Freud (1904). Later con-
tributions document that individuals tend to recall their successes more than their
failures, and have self-servingly biased recollections of their past performances (Ko-
rner, 1950; Crary, 1966; Mischel et al., 1976). Selective memory has since been used
in many contributions to the economics literature, as reviewed below. Whereas we
allow the earlier self to strategically forget signals it observes, we impose the con-
straint that the later self is aware of the earlier self’s incentive to manipulate and that
it processes information in a fully Bayesian way.
The agent’s temporal selves therefore interact in a standard sequential game un-
der incomplete information, in which we solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Analogous to, e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (2006), however, the intra-personal game
is a modeling device and not a description of the agent’s mental processes. Specif-
ically, we do not mean to imply that the agent is consciously aware of the strategic
interaction of her temporal selves.
We assume that the different selves each have private, decision-relevant informa-
tion. The fact that an earlier self’s preferred course of action depends on information
only available to a later self implies that belief distortions set by the earlier self can
lead to excessive risk taking, even as judged from the perspective of the earlier, less
risk averse, self. We can now combine “demand” and “supply” to solve for the equi-
3We show in Eisenbach and Schmalz (2016) that dynamic inconsistency for intra-temporal risk
trade-offs is orthogonal to dynamic inconsistency for inter-temporal consumption trade-offs due to
non-geometric discounting as in Strotz (1955), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Laibson (1997). We also
discuss the use of external commitment devices to deal with “anxiety.”
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librium level of overconfidence of the intra-personal game. The equilibrium trades
off the benefit of overconfidence which is additional, desirable, risk taking in some
states of the world – thus mitigating the effect of “anxiety” – against the costs of
overconfidence in terms of excessive risk taking in other states of the world.
Our model generates a rich set of predictions. First, we show that agents may
appear overconfident or underconfident to an outside observer, depending on the
true state of the world. Specifically, agents displaying overconfidence are observed
when actual risks are high and vice versa.We interpret the prediction that confidence
positively covaries with current risk levels as consistent with the view of Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) and Akerlof and Shiller (2010) that overconfidence is high at the
peak of booms whereas underconfidence prevails in the trough of crises.4
Second, themodel predicts that in the cross-section, agents in systematically high-
risk environments are more overconfident than agents in systematically low-risk en-
vironments. This result is consistent with the high levels of overconfidence observed,
e.g. for CFOs (Ben-David et al., 2013) and the low levels observed, e.g. for auditors
(Tomassini et al., 1982). Third, the agent in ourmodel is only overconfident about im-
mediate uncertainty, but has no reason for overconfidence at longer horizons. This
predictionmatches the details of the evidence in Ben-David et al. (2013), where CFOs
are overconfident only at short horizons and are well calibrated at longer horizons.
Finally, agents with stronger “anxiety” display stronger biases in confidence. This
implies that the pro-cyclicality of confidence is strongest for the most anxious agents
leading them to overtrading, buying high and selling low. This prediction is con-
sistent with the empirical evidence in Lo et al. (2005), which indicates that more
emotional traders generate lower profits.
The model can also generate amplification effects if applied to settings that take
overconfidence as an input to generate speculative behavior (Harrison and Kreps,
1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). Overconfident traders have a greater demand
for risk, which leads to more overconfidence and thus generates positive feedback.
Conversely, crises trigger an underconfidence spiral. Taken together, the mechanism
we propose is a natural amplifier of economic fluctuations.
The model can serve as a reduced-formmetaphor for the choice of the agent’s in-
4Cohn et al. (2015) provide evidence from the lab for the role of “fear” in causing confidence cycles
of financial professionals.
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formation and communication environment, for example, in an organizational frame-
work. For example, executives may discourage subordinates from warning them
about risks, explicitly or implicitly through the choice of reward andpunishment sys-
tems (“killing the messenger”). This prediction resonates with the marginalization
of risk managers in the financial sector before the recent crisis (Flannery et al., 2012).
However, the model can also be interpreted more literally as self-manipulation with
alcohol or other drugs, which can take place ex ante consciously or subconsciously.
For example, Steptoe and Fidler (1987) find that among professional musicians, the
use of sedatives to cope with performance anxiety is higher in those with high levels
of anxiety than those with low levels.
The remainder of this section discusses the related literature. In Section 2, we
review existing experimental evidence that supports our assumption that temporal
distance affects risk-taking behavior. We analyze the model in Section 3. Section 4
suggests interpretations and discusses applications of the model. We conclude in
Section 5. All proofs are in the appendix.
Related Literature. Our model sheds light on how overconfidence can be formed
and sustained in equilibrium, making it “[p]erhaps the most robust finding in the
psychology of judgment” (De Bondt and Thaler, 1994). In economics and finance,
overconfidence has often been used as an assumption to (formally or informally) ex-
plain the behavior of speculative investors (e.g. Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003), the
ventures of entrepreneurs (e.g. Bernardo and Welch, 2001), corporate decision mak-
ing (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Gervais et al., 2011) or the pricing schedules of
firms (e.g. Grubb, 2009).5
Research documenting overconfidence (in the strict sense of an overprecision of
beliefs) goes back to Alpert and Raiffa (1982) who ask 800 HarvardMBAs to provide
percentiles of their subjective uncertainty about 10 quantities, e.g. “The number of
‘Physicians and Surgeons’ listed in the 1968 Yellow Pages of the phone directory for
Boston and vicinity.” On average, the true value falls within a student’s 50-percent
confidence interval only 34 percent of the time and within the 98-percent confidence
interval only 66 percent of the time. Subjects are also overconfident when asked
5See also, e.g. Harrison and Kreps (1978), Cooper et al. (1988), Daniel et al. (1998), Odean (1998,
1999), Barber and Odean (2001), Shefrin (2001), Koellinger et al. (2007), Hackbarth (2008), and Deaves
et al. (2009).
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about objectively uncertain randomvariables, e.g. the Consumer Price Index (Brown,
1973). In the field, overconfidence has been systematically documented among fi-
nance practitioners as early as Staël von Holstein (1972) and more recently, e.g. by
Deaves et al. (2010), Inoue et al. (2012), Ben-David et al. (2013) or Glaser et al. (2013).
The literature sometimes uses the term “overconfidence” to describe other bi-
ases besides “overprecision”, including agents overestimating their performance or
ability in absolute terms (“overestimation”) or relative to others (“overplacement”).
Work such as Klayman et al. (1999) shows that overconfidence in the form of overly
narrow subjective confidence intervals is the most pronounced phenomenon the lit-
erature has labeled “overconfidence.”Moore andHealy (2008) systematically disam-
biguate various alternative interpretations of overconfidence and confirm that over-
precision of beliefs is empirically the most robust finding of overconfidence in the
literature.6 Lichtenstein et al. (1982) survey the classic literature; for a recent review
of the literature on overconfidence, overoptimism, and related concepts, see Grubb
(2015).
Overconfidence as overprecision has been exogenously assumed in existingmod-
els of overconfidence, e.g. by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) where agents treat their
signals as more precise than they truly are. In contrast, wemicrofoundwhy overcon-
fidence arises endogenously. Our model of intra-personal conflict and equilibrium
manipulation follows the spirit of Bénabou and Tirole (2002), who show that over-
estimating personal ability can be a self-motivating strategy for an agent with im-
perfect willpower, modeled by way of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Such an agent
has dynamically inconsistent preferences with respect to intertemporal trade-offs,
i.e. when comparing current costs of effort with future benefits. Carrillo andMariotti
(2000) also study an agent with dynamically inconsistent consumption preferences
and show how incomplete learning can arise to effectively commit. In contrast to
these approaches, our model generates underestimation of risk, based on dynami-
cally inconsistent preferenceswith respect to intra-temporal risk trade-offs.7 Concep-
tually, our setup falls into the category of “Bayesian persuasion” between a sender
6Benoît and Dubra (2011) even show that evidence on better- and worse-than-average effects is not
inconsistent with rational Bayesian information processing. On the distinction of different typed of
overconfidence, see also Moore and Schatz (2017).
7Besides intra-personal conflict, overconfidence can also be a useful device to affect tradeoffs in
inter-personal conflicts such as in a standard Cournot duopoly (Kyle and Wang, 1997).
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and receiver as characterized by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011); in our case, sender
and receiver are two temporal selves of a single agent.
Our assumption of horizon-dependent risk aversion is based on extensive exper-
imental evidence discussed in detail in Section 2 (Jones and Johnson, 1973; Onculer,
2000; Sagristano et al., 2002; Noussair and Wu, 2006; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010;
Coble and Lusk, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). As an assumption about preferences,
what we call “anxiety” is orthogonal to the belief-based concept of “cold feet” de-
veloped in Epstein and Kopylov (2007). It is more closely related to Epstein (2008),
who – in contrast to our work and the experimental evidence we discuss below –
assumes risk aversion is higher for distant risks than for imminent risks. Eisenbach
and Schmalz (2016) provide a more detailed distinction of horizon-dependent risk
aversion from other theories such as time-changing risk aversion, preference for the
timing of resolution of uncertainty, and dynamically inconsistent time preferences.
The use of selective memory as a mechanism that generates belief distortions has
precedents, for example, in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) or Bordalo et al. (2017) (see
also Hirshleifer and Welch, 2002). Ericson (2011) also features overconfidence and
memory but in the sense that agents overestimate the quality of their memory. Bar-
beris et al. (2015) generate rich implicationswhen beliefs are formed by extrapolation
of experiences of the recent past. Greenwood andNagel (2009), andMalmendier and
Nagel (2011, 2016) provide evidence that individual-specific information choice af-
fects expectations and investment behavior. Also related is Compte and Postlewaite
(2004), who study biases in information processing motivated by the effect of emo-
tions on performance: to optimize performance, their agents have to manage their
emotions, which they achieve through selective information processing. Instead of
selective memory, van den Steen (2004, 2011) shows that agents who start with het-
erogeneous priors but are fully rational can end upwith overconfident posteriors. In
Gervais and Odean (2001), a bias in learning about ability generates overconfidence
over time.
Finally, our model is cast within the standard expected utility framework. This
feature contrasts with models that allow the prize space to include mental states
(e.g. Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Köszegi, 2006), information entering the utility func-
tion directly (e.g. Pagel, 2017), preferences over information due to disappointment
effects (e.g. Gul, 1991; Andries and Haddad, 2017), as well as utility from anticipa-
7
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tion (e.g. Brunnermeier and Parker, 2006; Brunnermeier et al., 2007, 2017) ormemory
(e.g. Gilboa et al., 2015). Also, the preferences of our agents don’t change over time in
anticipated or unanticipatedways (as in Loewenstein et al., 2003); instead, our agents
deal with dynamically inconsistent risk preferences at each point of time. See Brun-
nermeier and Julliard (2008), and Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) on other belief biases
that have been linked to the housing frenzy in the run-up to the financial crisis.
2 Evidence for Horizon-Dependent Risk Aversion
Temporal distance has been documented to affect risk-taking behavior in field and
laboratory experiments. In particular, subjects tend to be more risk averse when a
risk is temporally close than when it is distant, both in across-subject and within-
subject studies. In this section, we discuss several studies besides the one by Jones
and Johnson (1973) mentioned in the introduction. Specifically, we highlight studies
with purely monetary payoffs and rigorous elicitation of risk aversion.8
Experimental economics widely uses the protocol of Holt and Laury (2002) to
elicit risk aversion. Subjects are presented with a list of choices between two binary
lotteries. The first lottery always has two intermediate prizes, for example, ($10.00,
$8.00), whereas the second lottery always has a high and a low prize, for example,
($19.25, $0.50). The experimenter then changes the respective probabilities of the two
prizes, varying from (0.1, 0.9) to (0.9, 0.1). As the probabilitymass shifts from the sec-
ond prize to the first prize of both lotteries, the second lottery becomes increasingly
attractive compared to the first lottery. Subjects are asked to pick one of two lotteries
for each of the probability distributions. The probability distribution at which a sub-
ject switches from the “safe” lottery to the “risky” lottery is a proxy for the subject’s
risk aversion. Noussair and Wu (2006) use this protocol for a within-subjects design
with real payoffs, having each subject make choices for resolution and payout that
occur immediately and also for risks and payouts that occur three months later. The
study finds that more than one third of subjects are more risk averse for the present
than for the future. Coble and Lusk (2010) use the protocol for an across-subjects
8As another example, Welch (1999) documents preference reversals caused by stage fright. He
finds that 67% of subjects who agree to tell a joke in front of a class the following week in exchange
for $1 “chicken out”when themoment of truth arrives. By contrast, none of thosewho decline initially
change their mind.
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design and find the same pattern, with average risk aversion increasing with the
temporal proximity of the risk.
In a different type of experiment, Baucells andHeukamp (2010) let subjects choose
between two binary lotteries, a “safer” and a “riskier” one. Different treatments vary
the delay until the lotteries are resolved and paid out. The study finds that more sub-
jects choose the riskier lottery as the delay increases. Sagristano, Trope, and Liber-
man (2002) also have subjects choose between two lotteries, and find the same effect
of temporal proximity.
Finally, some studies elicit risk aversion by asking subjects for their certainty
equivalents for different lotteries; a lower certainty equivalent corresponds to higher
risk aversion. In Onculer (2000), subjects state their certainty equivalent for a lottery
to be resolved and paid immediately, as well as for the same lottery to be resolved
and paid in the future. The study finds that subjects state significantly lower cer-
tainty equivalents for the immediate lottery than for the future lottery. Abdellaoui,
Diecidue, and Onculer (2011) conduct a similar study with real payoffs, and find
equivalent results.
3 Model of Overconfidence
This section lays out the model of endogenous overconfidence. We first describe the
“demand” for overconfidence based on horizon-dependent risk aversion. Such pref-
erences imply a dynamic inconsistency: the agent would like to take more risks in
the future but prefers to take less risk in the present. We find that the agent’s present
self would like to make the future self overconfident to induce greater risk-taking.
Overconfidence can thus serve as a substitute for external commitment devices.
We then describe the environment our agent faces, including risk trade-offs as
well as information available to selves at different times and the resulting possibili-
ties for earlier selves to affect the beliefs of later selves, that is, the “supply” of over-
confidence. Finally, we combine “demand” and “supply” in solving for the equilib-
rium level of overconfidence in the intra-personal game played among the agent’s
temporal selves.
9
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Figure 1: “Anxious” preferences with horizon-dependent risk aversion.
3.1 Preferences
Figure 1 gives a stylized example of the horizon-dependent choice behavior docu-
mented experimentally. The agent has to choose between a risky alternative – re-
ceiving 4 with probability 1/3 – or a safe alternative – receiving 1 for sure. Because
the expected value of the risky alternative is greater than 1, a risk-averse agent may
prefer either of the two alternatives, depending on the level of risk aversion. The
experimental evidence points to agents who prefer the risky alternative when the
risk is temporally distant, but prefer the safe alternative when the risk is temporally
close, as indicated in Figure 1. More generally, consider a typical risk-reward trade-
off given by two lotteries x˜ and y˜, where x˜ has “higher risk” but also “higher reward”
than y˜ if we assume x˜ = y˜+ ε˜+ µwith ε˜ a mean-zero lottery independent of y˜ and µ
a constant. To capture the experimental evidence of agents who prefer the risky lot-
tery x˜ to y˜ if both are delayed, but prefer the safe lottery y˜ to x˜ if both are immediate,
we use a two-period setup t = 0, 1 and assume a utility specification Ut given by
U0 = E[v(c0) + δu(c1)] and U1 = E[v(c1)],
whereE is the expectations operator and δ ≤ 1 is a discount factor.More importantly,
v and u are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indexes that depend on whether a
risk is imminent or distant. To generate the same choice behavior as documented
experimentally, the utility specification has to satisfy the following two conditions
for the lotteries x˜, y˜:
For distant lotteries: E
[
δu(x˜)
]
> E
[
δu(y˜)
]
For imminent lotteries: E
[
v(x˜)
]
< E
[
v(y˜)
]
.
10
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Given the definitions of x˜ and y˜, these conditions can be satisfied only with v more
risk averse than u:
−v
′′(c)
v′(c)
≥ −u
′′(c)
u′(c)
for all c.
Note that the discount factors δ play no role in the two conditions above.9 The above
derivation illustrates that intra-temporal risk trade-offs and inter-temporal consump-
tion trade-offs are conceptually very different; the experimental evidence can there-
fore not be addressed by relaxing the standard assumption of geometric discounting.
As an example, let v(c) =
√
c and u(c) = c and set δ = 1. Then the agent is risk
averse with respect to current uncertainty and risk neutral with respect to future
uncertainty. Now consider the following lotteries for x˜, y˜:
x˜ =
 4 with prob. α0 with prob. 1− α and y˜ = 1.
Then v prefers the risky x˜ to the safe y˜ if α > 1/2 , whereas u prefers x˜ to y˜ if α > 1/4
and disagreement exists between v and u for all α ∈ (1/4, 1/2) as illustrated in Figure
1. In particular, suppose α = 1/3 and that the lotteries are resolved and paid out in
period 1. Then the agent will choose the safe option y˜ in period 1 but would prefer
to commit to the risky option x˜ in the initial period 0.
3.2 Environment
Formally, we assume that outright commitment devices are relatively costly or not
available at all. Instead, the agent’s earlier self may try to distort the later self’s beliefs
to manipulate the later self’s decisions. In particular, the earlier self would like to
convince the later self that risks are lower than they actually are. Such a conviction
would lead the later self to make riskier decisions that are more in line with the
earlier self’s preferences. The question is whether such belief manipulation can be
achieved in equilibrium.
To make the problem interesting, we add two important elements. First, we as-
9The fact that discount factors do not matter in our context is the reason we employ a simple
time-separable framework, which would otherwise lead to a conflation of time and risk preferences.
Andries et al. (2018) present a utility function that allows for a clean separation in a fully dynamic
setting.
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sume the agent is rational so the later self is fully aware of the earlier self’s incentives
to manipulate. The two selves therefore interact in a strategic way, and we have to
study the equilibrium of the agent’s intra-personal game. Second, we assume the
later self has access to additional information that is decision relevant also from the
perspective of the earlier self.With this assumption,manipulating the beliefs is costly
because doing so may lead to sub-optimal decisions by the later self.
To analyze the intra-personal manipulation game, we use a setting similar to
models studying belief manipulation with β-δ time inconsistency (Carrillo andMar-
iotti, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). There are two periods t = 0, 1. In period 1, the
agent faces a risk-reward trade-off, having to choose between a risky and a safe alter-
native. The risky alternative is given by a lottery with random payoff x characterized
by its distribution function Gθ, where θ ∈ {H, L} denotes a state of the world that
determines how risky the lottery is. We assume GH is a mean-preserving spread of
GL, so the risky alternative is unambiguously riskier in state H than in state L. The
ex-ante probability of the high-risk state H is given by pi. The safe alternative, on the
other hand, is given by a constant payoff a.
When facing the decision in period 1, the agent evaluates the risk using utility
v, and therefore wants to take the risky alternative whenever the expected utility is
higher than that of the safe alternative:∫ ∞
−∞
v(x) dGθ(x) > v(a)
Denoting the certainty equivalent of Gθ given the utility function v by cθv, this condi-
tion can be rewritten as
cθv > a.
The agent wants to take the risky alternative whenever its certainty equivalent cθv is
greater than the safe alternative a.
When thinking about the decision ahead of time (in period 0), the agent evaluates
the risk using utility u and thereforewants the future self to take the risky alternative
whenever ∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGθ(x) > δu(a) ⇔ cθu > a.
As in the simple numerical example above, we have potential disagreement between
12
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a acθv cθu
Value of safe
alternative a
Self 1 wants to take risk
Self 0 wants to take risk
Region of disagreement
Figure 2: Disagreement between the agent’s selves under full information.
self 0 and self 1.
Lemma 1. Because v is more risk averse than u, we have cθu > cθv for both θ ∈ {H, L} so
the agent in period 0 (self 0) and the agent in period 1 (self 1) will disagree about the right
course of action whenever a ∈ [cθv, cθu].
Figure 2 illustrates the disagreement between the agent’s temporal selves under
complete information. If the safe alternative is sufficiently unappealing – the value
of a is very low – both selves prefer to take the risky alternative and vice versa if the
value of a is very high. For intermediate values of a, however, self 0 prefers the risky
alternative whereas self 1 prefers the safe alternative.
The problem becomes interesting when information is incomplete. We therefore
assume that both of the agent’s selves have partial, decision-relevant information.
Specifically, the state of theworld θ is revealed to the agent at the beginning of period
0 in the form of a perfectly informative “red flag” warning signal s if the state is high
risk:
s =
 R if θ = H∅ if θ = L .
The payoff of the safe alternative a, however, is not known to the agent until period
1. Self 0 only knows the prior distribution F on [a, a], but self 1 observes the realized
value of a.
The only way that we allow self 0 to affect the beliefs of self 1 is through its treat-
ment of the signal s. In particular, we assume imperfect memory: if self 0 observes
a red flag, s = R, then the agent forgets the signal with probability ϕ ∈ [0, 1], such
that self 1’s recollection of the signal is sˆ = ∅ with probability ϕ and sˆ = R with
13
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probability 1− ϕ. The probability of forgetting the signal s is under the control of
self 0 but out of the control of self 1.
Selectivememory is a well-established phenomenon in the psychology literature,
as reviewed in the introduction. Note that we allow self 0 to affect the beliefs of self
1 only indirectly through forgetting, but don’t allow self 0 to directly influence self
1’s beliefs. In addition, we allow only the neglect of information that exists and not
any fabrication of information that does not exist. Finally and most importantly, we
assume self 1 is aware of self 0’s incentive to manipulate, and processes information
in a fully Bayesianway. In sum, we consider the belief distortion allowed to the agent
to be a fairly weak assumption.10
These assumptions don’t have to be interpreted literally, in the sense of imagining
that the individual can directly and consciously suppress memories. Indeed, we find
it more difficult to imagine a conscious decision to forget. By contrast, realizing that
remembering often takes a conscious effort may be more intuitive. Not making such
an effort, which likely results in forgetting, can therefore be viewed as a conscious
choice. That said, our model is not necessarily meant to describe the agent’s actual
mental process. Our model is equally consistent with a Freudian view where some
memories get buried in the unconscious, with some probability of reappearance.
Whichever the preferred interpretation, as most standard models in economics, the
model presented here simply provides a framework with an equilibrium that repre-
sents observed behavior and beliefs, and yields insights into the underlying trade-
offs. Section 4 below discusses how our reduced-form structure of belief manipula-
tion can be interpreted in practice as a choice of social environments, information
systems, or as self-manipulation with alcohol and drugs.
3.3 Intra-personal Game
Given our setup, self 0 and self 1 are playing a sequential intra-personal game with
incomplete information. First self 0 chooses the forgetting probability ϕ, taking into
account self 1’s behavior, and then self 1 decides between the risky and the safe al-
10Formally, our assumptions about signals and memory are without loss of generality. As shown
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), in environments such as ours an analogue of the “revelation
principle” applies and we can effectively restrict the number of messages available to self 0 to the
number of states of the world θ.
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• Nature chooses state of the world
θ ∈ {H, L} with pi
• Self 0 observes signal s ∈ {∅,R}
• For s = R, self 0 chooses forgetting
probability ϕ ∈ [0, 1]
• For θ = H, nature chooses remem-
bered signal sˆ ∈ {∅,R} with ϕ
• Nature chooses value of safe alter-
native a ∈ [a, a] with F
• Self 1 observes signal sˆ ∈ {R,∅}
• Self 1 chooses risky or safe alterna-
tive
t = 0 t = 1
t
Figure 3: Timeline of intra-personal game.
ternative, taking into account self 0’s behavior. Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of the
intra-personal game; Figure 8 in the appendix gives an extensive-form representa-
tion. We are interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this intra-personal game.
First, we derive self 1’s best response in period 1, taking as given an expected
forgetting probability ϕe. If self 1 remembers seeing a red flag, sˆ = R, she knows the
state of the world is high risk and chooses the risky alternative if a < cHv . If self 1
doesn’t remember seeing a red flag, sˆ = ∅, she assigns a posterior probability to the
state of the world being high risk given by:
pˆi(ϕe) =
piϕe
piϕe + 1− pi .
Naturally, the posterior probability of being in the high-risk state is increasing in the
probability of forgetting a red flag, pˆi′(ϕe) > 0.
Self 1’s posterior distribution for the risky payoff is then given by:
Gˆ(x|ϕe) = pˆi(ϕe)GH(x) +
(
1− pˆi(ϕe))GL(x).
Since GH is a mean-preserving spread of Gˆ, self 1 will be overconfident if the true state
of the world is high-risk. Conversely, since Gˆ is a mean-preserving spread of GL, self
1 will be underconfident if the true state of the world is low-risk. Given the Bayesian
posterior Gˆ(x|ϕe), self 1 chooses the risky alternative if a < cv(ϕe), where cv(ϕe) is
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the certainty equivalent of the risky alternative given ϕe, implicitly defined by∫ ∞
−∞
v(x) dGˆ(x|ϕe) = v(cv(ϕe)).
Next, we derive self 0’s best response in t = 0, taking as given self 1’s behavior for
an expected ϕe. If self 0 receives awarning signal and chooses a forgetting probability
ϕ, her expected utility is
EU0(ϕ | ϕe) = (1− ϕ)
[
F
(
cHv
) ∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGH(x) +
∫ a
cHv
δu(a) dF(a)
]
+ ϕ
[
F
(
cv(ϕe)
) ∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGH(x) +
∫ a
cv(ϕe)
δu(a) dF(a)
]
.
In the first line of EU0, with probability 1 − ϕ, the agent remembers the warning
signal in period 1 and uses the certainty equivalent cHv as the threshold; then she
chooses the risky alternative for payoffs of the safe alternative below the threshold,
a ∈ [a, cHv ), and chooses the safe alternative for payoffs above the threshold, a ∈[
cHv , a
]
. In the second line of EU0, with probability ϕ, the agent forgets the warning
signal and uses the certainty equivalent cv(ϕe) as the threshold, choosing the risky
alternative for a ∈ [a, cv(ϕe)) and the safe alternative for a ∈ [cv(ϕe), a].11
Definition. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the agent’s intra-personal game is a
pair of strategies (σ0, σ1) for the agent’s temporal selves 0 and 1, respectively, and a
belief vˆ for self 1 such that:
1. Self 0’s strategy σ0 = ϕ∗ maximizes EU0(ϕ | ϕe) for ϕe = ϕ∗.
2. Self 1’s strategy σ1 : {∅,R} × [a, a] → {risky, safe} is given by cutoffs cv(ϕ∗)
for sˆ = ∅ and cHv for sˆ = R.
3. Self 1’s belief is Bayesian, i.e., vˆ = pˆi(ϕ∗) for sˆ = ∅ and vˆ = 1 for sˆ = R.
11Note that it doesn’t matter whether self 0 chooses ϕ before or after the risk state θ is realized as
the expected utility before the realization is simply given by
piEU0(ϕ | ϕe) + (1− pi)
[
F
(
cv(ϕe)
) ∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGL(x) +
∫ a
cv(ϕe)
δu(a) dF(a)
]
,
where the second part doesn’t depend on ϕ and is therefore irrelevant for the maximization.
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a acHv cv(ϕe)
Value of safe
alternative a
Self 1 always takes risk
Self 1 takes risk if and only if sˆ = ∅
Self 1’s cutoff
for sˆ = R
Self 1’s cutoff
for sˆ = ∅
Self 1 never takes risk
Figure 4: Effect of memory sˆ on self 1’s decision.
We denote by D(ϕe) the derivative of self 0’s expected utility with respect to her
choice variable ϕ conditional on the value ϕe expected by self 1. Thismarginal benefit
of forgetting is given by
D(ϕe) := δ
∫ cv(ϕe)
cHv
(∫ ∞
−∞
u(x) dGH(x)− u(a)
)
dF(a) .
The expression for D(ϕe) has a natural interpretation. As illustrated in Figure 4, the
remembered signal sˆ affects self 1’s decision only for realizations of the safe alterna-
tive a ∈ [cHv , cv(ϕe)]. In this interval, self 1 chooses the safe alternative whenever she
remembers seeing a red flag, and the risky alternative otherwise. The effect on self
0’s expected utility of forgetting the warning signal more often is exactly the differ-
ence in utility from the risky action compared to the safe action for the values of a
where the decision is affected.
Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria can exist in this intra-personal game,
characterized by the equilibrium forgetting probability ϕ∗:
Honesty: If D(0) ≤ 0, an equilibrium with ϕ∗ = 0 exists. In this equilibrium, the
agent never ignores red flags and doesn’t influence her future self’s beliefs.
Overconfidence: If D(1) ≥ 0, an equilibrium with ϕ∗ = 1 exists. In this equilib-
rium, the agent always ignores red flags and makes her future self maximally
overconfident.
Mixed: If D(ϕ¯) = 0 for some ϕ¯ ∈ (0, 1), an equilibrium with ϕ∗ = ϕ¯ exists. In
this equilibrium, the agent plays a mixed strategy, ignoring the red flag with
17
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R
∅
∅
cHv
cpiv
cpiv
Self 1’s
signal
Self 1’s
cutoff
Appearance
to outsider
Well calibrated
Overconfident
Underconfident
State of
the world
H
L
Figure 5: Apparent over- and underconfidence to an outside observer.
probability ϕ¯, and makes her future self partially overconfident.
We have the following result on the existence of equilibria.
Proposition 1. One of the extreme equilibria always exists: either the honesty equilibrium or
the overconfidence equilibrium or both. If both extreme equilibria exist, a mixed equilibrium
also exists.
Since themixed equilibrium is not stable (see the proof of Proposition 1), we focus
on the extreme equilibria of overconfidence and honesty.
3.4 Apparent Over- and Underconfidence
In the overconfidence equilibrium ϕ∗ = 1, an outside observer will find the agent
using one of two cutoffs, as illustrated in Figure 5. If the state of the world is high
risk and the red flag signal was remembered, the agent’s self 1 is using the cutoff
cHv when deciding between the risky and the safe alternative. To an outside observer
who knows the agent’s preferences v and the true state of the world H, the agent
therefore appears to have well calibrated beliefs.
By contrast, if (i) the state isH but thewarning signalwas forgotten or (ii) the state
is L, the agent’s self 1 is using the cutoff cv(1) = cpiv , i.e. with the prior probability of
high riskpi.While the agent herself cannot distinguish between (i) and (ii), an outside
observerwho knows the state can andwill interpret the agent’s behavior accordingly.
In case (i), the agent using cpiv appears overconfident to the outside world, because –
based on her preference v – she is expected to use cHv < cv(ϕ∗). In case (ii), the agent
using cpiv appears underconfident, because she is expected to use cLv > cpiv . We can
now state the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. In the overconfidence equilibrium, agents can appear to be ex-post over- or
underconfident. Moreover, the appearance is linked to the true state of the world:
• Agents displaying overconfidence can only be observed if the state is high risk.
• Agents displaying underconfidence can only be observed if the state is low risk.
A benefit of the fully rational framework and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
analysis is that we can interpret the results of Corollary 1 in the time series. As long
as the realization of the state of the world θ is i.i.d. so that learning has no role, we
can imagine the simple two-period setup being repeated in sequence.
Empirically, Reinhart andRogoff (2009) aswell asAkerlof and Shiller (2010) argue
that at the peaks of booms –when actual risks are high – overconfidencewidespread,
whereas underconfidence is common in the trough of crises –when actual risk is low.
Our model predicts exactly that: agents appear overconfident when risks are high
and underconfident when risks are low. In fact, also the CFOs in Ben-David et al.
(2013) are more overconfident during times of high volatility than during times of
low volatility.
3.5 Cross-sectional Differences in Confidence
The existence of each kind of equilibrium depends on all main primitives of the
model, which yields the following comparative statics.
Proposition 2. The overconfidence equilibrium is more likely to exist in any of the following
situations:
1. If the agent is more prone to anxiety – in the sense that u remains unchanged but v is
even more risk averse.
2. If the high-risk state is more likely ex ante – in the sense that pi is higher.
3. If the high-risk state is more risky – in the sense that GL remains unchanged but a
mean-preserving spread is added to GH.
Figure 6 illustrates the comparative statics of Proposition 2 by showing how the
function D(ϕe) is affected by increasing anxiety, and the likelihood or the riskiness
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1 1 1
ϕe ϕe ϕe
D(ϕe) D(ϕe) D(ϕe)
more anxiety / high-risk more likely / high-risk more risky
Honesty equilibrium Overconfidence equilibrium Mixed equilibrium (unstable)
Figure 6: Effect of more anxiety, and higher likelihood or riskiness of the
high risk state on D(ϕe) and resulting equilibria.
of the high risk state. All three increase D(ϕe) which makes D(1) ≥ 0 and therefore
existence of the overconfidence equilibrium more likely (see the Proof of Proposi-
tion 2 for more detail). Perhaps counterintuitively, we find that agents who are more
prone to anxiety when facing immediate risk are the ones that are more likely to ex-
hibit overconfidence. In terms of the environment agents are in, we find that a riskier
environment – both ex ante and ex post – is more conducive to overconfidence.
We can interpreting the results of Proposition 2 in the cross-section of environ-
ments faced by different agents. The fact that agents in riskier environments aremore
likely to exhibit overconfidence is reminiscent of work on cognitive dissonance such
as Akerlof and Dickens (1982). Such studies typically assume psychic utility, such as
the fear of accidents, as entering the agent’s utility directly. By contrast, our frame-
work also applies to environments where the agent’s job involves risk taking with-
out risk of bodily harm. For example, according to the model, finance professionals
should be particularly likely to display overconfidence, as documented by Ben-David
et al. (2013).
Note that, by construction, the agent in our model is only overconfident about
immediate uncertainty, that is, self 1 in t = 1. However, even if we generalized the
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model to include selves prior to self 0, no incentive would exist to make any self
overconfident other than the one facing the risk andmaking the decision. This detail
of themodel predictions squares nicelywith the details of the evidence of Ben-David
et al. (2013)who findCFOs are overconfident only at short horizons and are unbiased
at longer horizons.
Combining the time-series result of Section 3.4 with the cross-sectional results of
this section generates additional predictions. Relative to the average market partic-
ipant, agents more prone to anxiety will exhibit greater swings between over- and
underconfidence over time. The greater fluctuation in their “emotion-driven beliefs”
leads anxiety-prone agents to trade more, as documented by Odean (1998, 1999). In
addition, since their confidence is pro-cyclical, themore “emotional” agents also end
up systematically on the wrong side of the market – buying high and selling low –
thus loosing money as documented by Lo et al. (2005).
In a more general setting, feedback effects could emerge. Overconfident traders
have a greater demand for risk than unbiased traders so that overconfidence sus-
tains and reinforces excessive risk levels. Conversely, in a crisis, an underconfidence
feedback could depress price levels below fundamentals.
3.6 Excessive Risk Taking
Welfare statements in models with dynamically inconsistent preferences are prob-
lematic (Schelling, 1984). Nevertheless, our model allows us to characterize certain
risk taking as excessive. Specifically, the future self can end up taking risks that even
the less risk-averse current self would have avoided. To an observer who is unaware
of the agent’s intra-personal conflict and resulting equilibrium level of overconfi-
dence, the agent seems to be taking risks that are greater than can be explained even
based on the less risk-averse preference u.
Corollary 2. If cHu < cpiv and an equilibrium with overconfidence exists, the agent will be
observed to take excessive risks, that is, she will appear less risk averse than both v and u.
This seemingly paradoxical situation of an anxious agent taking excessive risks
can arise if the true state of the world is high risk, θ = H, but the agent forgets the
warning signal, sˆ = ∅. In this case, self 0 would like the cutoff cHu to be used, but self
1 actually uses the cutoff cv(1) = cpiv . As illustrated in Figure 7, whenever the payoff
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a acHv cpiv
Value of safe
alternative a
cHu
Self 1 takes risk if sˆ = ∅
Self 0 doesn’t want risk
Excessive risk taking
Figure 7: Excessive risk taking for cHu < cpiv .
of the safe alternative is between the two cutoffs, a ∈ (cHu , cpiv ), the agent takes risks
in period 1 that even self 0 considers excessive. Of course, the paradox is due to the
fact that self 0 knows the state of the world to be high-risk while self 1 has to rely on
her Bayesian posterior.
Excessive risk taking can arise because the condition for an equilibriumwith over-
confidence, D(ϕ∗|v) ≥ 0 does not necessarily imply that EH[u (x)] > u(a) for all
a < cv(ϕ∗), i.e., that self 0 wants the risky alternative where self 1 chooses it. To
an outside observer who knows the state is H, the anxious agent using the cutoff
cv(ϕ∗) = cpiv appears to be less risk averse than the non-anxious preference u. This
impression is not true, however. Rather, the anxious agent using the cutoff cv(ϕ∗) is
systematically overconfident.
Why such excessive risk taking is an equilibrium outcome can be illustrated as
follows. From Lemma 1, we know the certainty equivalents always satisfy cHv < cHu .
In an equilibrium with excessive risk taking, we also have cHu < cpiv . Given these two
inequalities, we can decompose the marginal effect of forgetting more often on self
0’s utility as follows:
D(ϕ∗) = δ
∫ cv(ϕ∗)
cHv
(∫ ∞
−∞
u(x) dGH(x)− u(a)
)
dF(a)
=δ
∫ cHu
cHv
(∫ ∞
−∞
u(x) dGH(x)− u(a)
)
dF(a)
− δ
∫ cpiv
cHu
(∫ ∞
−∞
u(x) dGH(x)− u(a)
)
dF(a) .
In an equilibrium ϕ∗ with excessive risk taking, we have D(ϕ∗) ≥ 0. Given the de-
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composition above, it follows that:
benefit of extra risk taking︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ cHu
cHv
(∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGH(x)− δu(a)
)
dF(a)
≥
∫ cpiv
cHu
(∫ ∞
−∞
δu(x) dGH(x)− δu(a)
)
dF(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of extra risk taking
.
For values of the safe alternative a > cHv , self 1 only takes risk if manipulated. For
a ∈ (cHv , cHu ), such risk taking is desirable from self 0’s point of view as captured by
the utility benefit on the left-hand side of the inequality. For a ∈ (cHu , cpiv ), such risk
taking is excessive even from self 0’s perspective as captured by the utility cost on the
right-hand side of the inequality. For excessive risk taking to occur in equilibrium,
the benefit of more risk taking when desired has to outweigh the cost of too much
risk taking when not desired.
This result sheds light on the apparently excessive risk taking in the financial sec-
tor before the financial crisis of 2008–2009. While the actors involved, e.g. in the pro-
cess of securitization, were best placed to receive signals about the true risks, Cheng
et al. (2014) show these actors to be unaware of the risks. At the same time, many out-
side observers did see the risks that were building up, as cited in the introduction.
Our model provides an explanation for this apparent paradox.
4 Interpretations of the Model
Our model describes overconfidence as resulting from a choice to forget risk signals.
We now discuss two alternative interpretations of the belief-manipulation structure
to illustrate the generality of our stylized framework, and to offer explanations that
do not require a literal interpretation of the model.
4.1 Choice of Information Environment
One interpretation for the model’s belief-manipulation framework is as a reduced-
form metaphor for the choice of the agent’s social or informational environment.
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Specifically, given a preference for a biased posterior, an anxiety-prone agent will
attempt to implement information and communication systems that render her mis-
informed about risks.
In an organizational context, management scholars and practitioners have re-
marked about the scarcity of openly expressed critical upward feedback. Indeed,
the lack of informal and open upward feedback is the reason for the establishment
of formal, anonymous upward-feedback mechanisms investigated by the personnel
psychology literature (Atwater et al., 1995; Smither et al., 1995; Walker and Smither,
1999; Atwater et al., 2000). Lack of upward feedback is often said to be implicitly or
explicitly mandated by the head of the organization (“killing the messenger”). Such
lack of upward feedback – especially to risk managers of financial firms – is consid-
ered an important contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Flannery
et al., 2012).
In the context of our model, an anxiety-prone leader will design incentives for
subordinates to systematically hide risk signals from her, especially in risky envi-
ronments. As a result, the more severe the dynamic inconsistency in the leader’s
preferences and the higher the actual risk level, the less upward feedback subordi-
nates will provide.12
Whereas these examples resonate with informal accounts of the informational
environments in Wall Street firms before the recent crises, direct evidence on the
biased choice of information from financial decision making also exists. Karlsson
et al. (2009) find that investors look up their portfolio performance less often after
receiving a signal about increased risks – behavior known as the “Ostrich Effect.”13
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that retail investors have little demand for unbiased
advice – especially those who need it the most.
12An alternative interpretation is that the leader is naive about her horizon-dependent risk prefer-
ences, but her subordinates are aware and support her long-term self’s risk-taking plans by supplying
her with biased information.
13The original finding is that investors tend to not look up their portfolio’s performance after
market-wide declines about which they are likely to become informed via generic news reports.
Falling prices are a signal for increased risk because either (i) increases in risk levels may cause price
drops, or (ii) falling prices increase volatility estimates.
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4.2 Self-manipulation with Alcohol and Drugs
A second interpretation of how the belief manipulation of our model may be imple-
mented in practice is through the use of alcohol and other drugs. This section gives
a brief review of psychological evidence on the effect of alcohol and other drugs on
(i) risky behavior, (ii) forgetting and confidence, and (iii) performance changes. In
addition, we discuss evidence on anxiety-prone individuals’ strategic use of alcohol
and other drugs to induce effects (i)–(iii).
The finding that alcohol is associated with more risky behavior is robust across
domains. Field studies have shown alcohol consumption leads to risky sexual be-
havior (Halpern-Felsher et al., 1996; Cooper, 2002), accident-related injuries (Cher-
pitel et al., 1995), and dangerous driving patterns (Donovan et al., 1983). Pathological
gambling is more common among people with alcohol-use disorders, and vice versa
(Grant et al., 2002; Petry et al., 2005). In the lab, Lane et al. (2004) establish causality
from alcohol consumption to risky behavior.
Low risk aversion or a low perception of risk can drive risky behavior. Cohen
et al. (1958) show that the riskier driving behavior caused by alcohol consumption is
associated with a decreased perception of risk, that is, a higher degree of overconfi-
dence. Supporting the mechanism our model suggests, alcohol has also been shown
to lead to forgetfulness, especially of negative signals (Nelson et al., 1986;Maylor and
Rabbitt, 1987).
Evidence also shows that drugs are used strategically to improve performance,
particularly by individuals with greater degrees of anxiety. As an example, Rimm
(2002) recounts that composer-pianist Sergei Rachmaninoff was anxious about play-
ing a particularly difficult passage in the 24th variation of his “Rhapsody on a Theme
of Paganini.” Based on a friend’s recommendation, Rachmaninoff – otherwise a com-
plete teetotaler – drank a glass of crème de menthe (a mint-flavored alcoholic bev-
erage) before the premiere, which he then executed faultlessly. Rachmaninoff sub-
sequently had the same drink before all performances of the piece and marked the
24th the “Crème de Menthe Variation.”
More generally, Steptoe and Fidler (1987) find that 17% of professional musicians
with high performance anxiety take sedatives as a method of coping. This number
compares to 4% of musicians with medium levels of performance anxiety that take
sedatives to cope, and 0%of the respondentswith lowperformance anxiety. Based on
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ourmodel, the performance of anxiety-prone individuals should improvewithmod-
erate levels of drug-induced overconfidence. James et al. (1977) as well as Brantigan
et al. (1982) show that the use of beta-blockers improves the performance of musi-
cianswho suffer from stage fright. Lastly, anecdotal evidence on the “widespread use
of [...] cocaine by professional traders” (Bossaerts, 2009) is consistent bothwith strate-
gic self-manipulation and with our observations about cross-sectional differences in
the level of overconfidence across environments.14 Note that our interpretation of the
use of alcohol and other drugs is in stark contrast to strategic self-handicapping (Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2002) or detrimental effects on intertemporal trade-offs (Schilbach,
2018).
5 Conclusion
Using standard tools in economics, this paper shows that horizon-dependent risk
aversion (“anxiety”) supplies a rationale for overconfident beliefs, wherein selective
information processing is used as a tool to accomplish self-delusion. The model pre-
dicts salient features of organizational design, such as a tendency to suppress up-
ward feedback about impending risks especially during times of high risk levels,
individuals’ choice of information systems and drug use that alter the perception of
risks, as well as observed equilibrium levels of overconfidence as measured in sur-
veys. Importantly, the model provides a rationale why individuals with access to the
most precise information about risk levels can hold the most inaccurate beliefs about
these risks, while outside observers have a more accurate view. Relatedly, we give a
precise meaning to the notion of “excessive risk taking,” and discuss the potential
of endogenously generated confidence levels to amplify economic fluctuations. We
leave an application to equilibrium asset-pricing models for future research.
14“Did cocaine use by bankers cause the global financial crisis?” The Guardian, Monday, April
15, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/business/shortcuts/2013/apr/15/cocaine-bankers-global-
financial-crisis
26
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
References
Abdellaoui, M., E. Diecidue, and A. Onculer (2011). Risk preferences at different time periods: An
experimental investigation. Management Science 57(5), 975–987.
AIG (2007). American International Group Q2 2007 earnings call transcript. http://seekingalpha.
com/article/44048-american-international-group-q2-2007-earnings-call-transcript.
Akerlof, G.A. andW.T.Dickens (1982). The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance.American
Economic Review 72(3), 307–319.
Akerlof, G. A. and R. J. Shiller (2010). Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and
Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton University Press.
Alpert, M. and H. Raiffa (1982). A progress report on the training of probability advisors. In D. Kah-
neman and A. Tversky (Eds.), In Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, pp. 294–305.
Cambridge University Press.
Andries, M., T. M. Eisenbach, and M. C. Schmalz (2018). Horizon-dependent risk aversion and the
timing and pricing of uncertainty. Working Paper.
Andries, M. and V. Haddad (2017). Information aversion. Working Paper.
Atwater, L., P. Roush, and A. Fischthal (1995). The influence of upward feedback on self- and follower
ratings of leadership. Personnel Psychology 48(1), 35–59.
Atwater, L. E., D. A. Waldman, D. Atwater, and P. Cartier (2000). An upward feedback field ex-
periment: Supervisors’ cynicism, reactions, and commitment to subordinates. Personnel Psychol-
ogy 53(2), 275–297.
Barber, B. M. and T. Odean (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock
investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 261–292.
Barberis, N. (2013). Psychology and the financial crisis of 2007–2008. In M. Haliassos (Ed.), Financial
Innovation: Too Much or Too Little? MIT Press.
Barberis, N., R. Greenwood, L. Jin, and A. Shleifer (2015). X-CAPM: An extrapolative capital asset
pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics 115(1), 1–24.
Baucells, M. and F. Heukamp (2010). Common ratio using delay. Theory and Decision 68(1-2), 149–158.
Ben-David, I., J. R. Graham, and C. R. Harvey (2013). Managerial miscalibration. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 128(4), 1547–1584.
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2002). Self-confidence and personal motivation. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 117(3), 871–915.
Benoît, J.-P. and J. Dubra (2011). Apparent overconfidence. Econometrica 79(5), 1591–1625.
Bernardo, A. E. and I. Welch (2001). On the evolution of overconfidence and entrepreneurs. Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 10(3), 301–330.
27
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Bhattacharya, U., A. Hackethal, S. Kaesler, B. Loos, and S. Meyer (2012). Is unbiased financial advice
to retail investors sufficient? Answers from a large field study. Review of Financial Studies 25(4),
975–1032.
De Bondt, W. F. M. and R. H. Thaler (1994). Financial decision-making in markets and firms: A be-
havioral perspective. Working Paper 4777, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer (2017). Memory, attention and choice. Working Paper.
Bossaerts, P. (2009). What decision neuroscience teaches us about financial decision making. Annual
Review of Financial Economics 1(1), 383–404.
Brantigan, C. O., T. A. Brantigan, and N. Joseph (1982). Effect of beta blockade and beta stimulation
on stage fright. American Journal of Medicine 72(1), 88–94.
Brown, T. A. (1973). An experiment in probabilistic forecasting. Report R-944-ARPA, RAND Corpo-
ration.
Brunnermeier, M. K., C. Gollier, and J. A. Parker (2007). Optimal beliefs, asset prices, and the prefer-
ence for skewed returns. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 97(2).
Brunnermeier, M. K. and C. Julliard (2008). Money illusion and housing frenzies. Review of Financial
Studies 21(1), 135–180.
Brunnermeier, M. K., F. Papakonstantinou, and J. A. Parker (2017). Optimal time-inconsistent beliefs:
Misplanning, procrastination, and commitment. Management Science 63(5), 1318–1340.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and J. A. Parker (2006). Optimal expectations. American Economic Review 95(4),
1092–1118.
Caplin, A. and J. Leahy (2001). Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 116(1), 55–79.
Carrillo, J. D. and T. Mariotti (2000). Strategic ignorance as a self-disciplining device. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 67(3), 529–544.
Case, K. E. and R. J. Shiller (2003). Is there a bubble in the housing market? Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2003(2), 299–362.
Cheng, I.-H., S. Raina, and W. Xiong (2014). Wall Street and the housing bubble. American Economic
Review 104(9), 2797–2829.
Cherpitel, C. J., T. Tam, L. Midanik, R. Caetano, and T. Greenfield (1995). Alcohol and non-fatal injury
in the U.S. general population: A risk function analysis. Accident Analysis & Prevention 27(5), 651–
661.
Coble, K. and J. Lusk (2010). At the nexus of risk and time preferences: An experimental investigation.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 41, 67–79.
Cohen, J., E. Dearnaley, and C. Hansel (1958). The risk taken in driving under the influence of alcohol.
British Medical Journal 1(5085), 1438.
28
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Cohn, A., J. Engelmann, E. Fehr, andM.A.Maréchal (2015). Evidence for countercyclical risk aversion:
An experiment with financial professionals. American Economic Review 105(2), 860–885.
Compte, O. and A. Postlewaite (2004). Confidence-enhanced performance. American Economic Re-
view 94(5), 1536–1557.
Cooper, A. C., C. Y. Woo, andW. C. Dunkelberg (1988). Entrepreneurs’ perceived chances for success.
Journal of Business Venturing 3(2), 97–108.
Cooper, M. L. (2002). Alcohol use and risky sexual behavior among college students and youth:
Evaluating the evidence. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 14, 101–117.
Crary, W. G. (1966). Reactions to incongruent self-experiences. Journal of Consulting Psychology 30(3),
246.
Daniel, K., D. Hirshleifer, and A. Subrahmanyam (1998). Investor psychology and security market
under- and overreactions. Journal of Finance 53(6), 1839–1885.
Deaves, R., E. Lüders, and G. Y. Luo (2009). An experimental test of the impact of overconfidence and
gender on trading activity. Review of Finance 13(3), 555–575.
Deaves, R., E. Lüders, and M. Schröder (2010). The dynamics of overconfidence: Evidence from stock
market forecasters. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75(3), 402–412.
Donovan, D. M., G. A. Marlatt, and P. M. Salzberg (1983). Drinking behavior, personality factors
and high-risk driving: A review and theoretical formulation. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and
Drugs 44(3), 395–428.
Eisenbach, T. M. and M. C. Schmalz (2016). Anxiety in the face of risk. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 121(2), 414 – 426.
Epstein, L. (2008). Living with risk. Review of Economic Studies 75(4), 1121–1141.
Epstein, L. G. and I. Kopylov (2007). Cold feet. Theoretical Economics 2(3), 231–259.
Ericson, K. M. M. (2011). Forgetting we forget: Overconfidence and memory. Journal of the European
Economic Association 9(1), 43–60.
Flannery, M. J., P. Glasserman, D. K. Mordecai, and C. Rossi (2012). Forging best practices in risk
management. Working Paper 0002, U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Financial Research.
Foote, C. L., K. S. Gerardi, and P. S. Willen (2012). Why did somany people make so many ex post bad
decisions? The causes of the foreclosure crisis. Working Paper 18082, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Freud, S. (1904). Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens. S. Karger.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine (2006). A dual-self model of impulse control. American Economic
Review 96(5), 1449–1476.
Gennaioli, N., Y. Ma, and A. Shleifer (2015). Expectations and investment. NBERMacro Annual 30(1).
29
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Gennaioli, N. and A. Shleifer (2010). What comes to mind. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4),
1399–1433.
Gervais, S., J. Heaton, and T. Odean (2011). Overconfidence, compensation contracts, and capital
budgeting. Journal of Finance 66(5), 1735–1777.
Gervais, S. and T. Odean (2001). Learning to be overconfident. Review of Financial Studies 14(1), 1–27.
Gilboa, I., A. Postlewaite, and L. Samuelson (2015). Memory utility. Working Paper.
Glaser, M., T. Langer, andM.Weber (2013). True overconfidence in interval estimates: Evidence based
on a new measure of miscalibration. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 26(5), 405–417.
Grant, J. E., M. G. Kushner, and S. W. Kim (2002). Pathological gambling and alcohol use disorder.
Alcohol Research and Health 26(2), 143–150.
Greenwood, R. and S. Nagel (2009). Inexperienced investors and bubbles. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 93(2), 239–258.
Grubb, M. D. (2009). Selling to overconfident consumers. American Economic Review 99(5), 1770–1807.
Grubb, M. D. (2015). Overconfident consumers in the marketplace. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 29(4), 9–36.
Gul, F. (1991). A theory of disappointment aversion. Econometrica 59(3), 667–686.
Hackbarth, D. (2008). Managerial traits and capital structure decisions. Journal of Financial and Quan-
titative Analysis 43, 843–882.
Halpern-Felsher, B. L., S. G. Millstein, and J. M. Ellen (1996). Relationship of alcohol use and risky
sexual behavior: A review and analysis of findings. Journal of Adolescent Health 19(5), 331–336.
Harrison, J. M. and D. M. Kreps (1978). Speculative investor behavior in a stock market with hetero-
geneous expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92(2), 323–336.
Himmelberg, C., C. Mayer, and T. Sinai (2005). Assessing high house prices: Bubbles, fundamentals,
and misperceptions. Working Paper 11643, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hirshleifer, D. and I. Welch (2002). An economic approach to the psychology of change: Amnesia,
inertia, and impulsiveness. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 11(3), 379–421.
Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review 92(5),
1644–1655.
Inoue, K., H. K. Kato, and T. Yamasaki (2012). Managerial overconfidence: Evidence from Japanese
CEOs. Working Paper.
James, I., D. Griffith, R. Pearson, and P. Newbury (1977). Effect of oxprenolol on stage-fright in musi-
cians. The Lancet 310(8045), 952–954.
Jones, E. E. and C. A. Johnson (1973). Delay of consequences and the riskiness of decisions. Journal of
Personality 41(4), 613–637.
30
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Kamenica, E. and M. Gentzkow (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review 101(6), 2590–
2615.
Karlsson, N., G. Loewenstein, and D. Seppi (2009). The ostrich effect: Selective attention to informa-
tion. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 38, 95–115.
Klayman, J., J. B. Soll, C. Gonzalez-Vallejo, and S. Barlas (1999). Overconfidence: It depends on how,
what, and whom you ask. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 79(3), 216–247.
Koellinger, P., M. Minniti, and C. Schade (2007). “I think I can, I think I can”: Overconfidence and
entrepreneurial behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology 28(4), 502–527.
Korner, I. N. (1950). Experimental Investigation of some aspects of the problem of repression: repressive for-
getting. Number 970. Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University.
Köszegi, B. (2006). Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice. Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 4(4), 673–707.
Kyle, A. S. and A.Wang (1997). Speculation duopoly with agreement to disagree: Can overconfidence
survive the market test? Journal of Finance 52(5), 2073–2090.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2),
443–477.
Lane, S. D., D. R. Cherek, C. J. Pietras, and O. V. Tcheremissine (2004). Alcohol effects on human risk
taking. Psychopharmacology 172(1), 68–77.
Lichtenstein, S., B. Fischhoff, and L. Phillips (1982). Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to
1980. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, pp. 306–334. Cambridge University Press.
Lo, A. W., D. V. Repin, and B. N. Steenbarger (2005). Fear and greed in financial markets: A clinical
study of day-traders. American Economic Review 95(2), 352–359.
Loewenstein, G., T. O’Donoghue, and M. Rabin (2003). Projection bias in predicting future utility.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1209–1248.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2011). Depression babies: Do macroeconomic experiences affect risk-
taking? Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 373–416.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2016). Learning from inflation experiences. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 131(1), 53–87.
Malmendier, U. and G. Tate (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Fi-
nance 60(6), 2661–2700.
Maylor, E. A. and P. Rabbitt (1987). Effect of alcohol on rate of forgetting. Psychopharmacology 91(2),
230–235.
Mischel, W., E. B. Ebbesen, and A. M. Zeiss (1976). Determinants of selective memory about the self.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 44(1), 92.
31
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Moore, D. A. and P. J. Healy (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological Review 115(2),
502–517.
Moore, D. A. and D. Schatz (2017). The three faces of overconfidence. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass 11(8), e12331.
Nelson, T. O., M. McSpadden, K. Fromme, and G. A. Marlatt (1986). Effects of alcohol intoxication
on metamemory and on retrieval from long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Gen-
eral 115(3), 247.
Noussair, C. and P. Wu (2006). Risk tolerance in the present and the future: An experimental study.
Managerial and Decision Economics 27(6), 401–412.
Odean, T. (1998). Volume, volatility, price, and profit when all traders are above average. Journal of
Finance 53(6), 1887–1934.
Odean, T. (1999). Do investors trade too much? American Economic Review 89(5), 1279–1298.
Onculer, A. (2000, April). Intertemporal choice under uncertainty: A behavioral perspective. Working
Paper 2000/37/TM, INSEAD.
Pagel, M. (2017). A news-utility theory for inattention and delegation in portfolio choice. Economet-
rica (forthcoming).
Petry, N. M., F. S. Stinson, and B. F. Grant (2005). Comorbidity of DSM-IV pathological gambling
and other psychiatric disorders: Results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and
Related Conditions. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 66(5), 564–574.
Phelps, E. S. and R. A. Pollak (1968). On second-best national saving and game-equilibrium growth.
Review of Economic Studies 35(2), 185–199.
Piazzesi, M. and M. Schneider (2008). Inflation illusion, credit, and asset prices. In J. Y. Campbell
(Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pp. 147–189. University of Chicago Press.
Reinhart, C.M. andK. S. Rogoff (2009). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton
University Press.
Rimm, R. (2002). The Composer-Pianists: Hamelin and The Eight. Amadeus Press.
Sagristano, M. D., Y. Trope, and N. Liberman (2002). Time-dependent gambling: Odds now, money
later. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 131(3), 364–376.
Scheinkman, J. A. and W. Xiong (2003). Overconfidence and speculative bubbles. Journal of Political
Economy 111(6), 1183–1219.
Schelling, T. C. (1984). Self-command in practice, in policy, and in a theory of rational choice. American
Economic Review 74(2), 1–11.
Schilbach, F. (2018). Alcohol and self-control: A field experiment in India. Working Paper.
Shefrin, H. (2001). Behavioral corporate finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14, 113–124.
32
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Shiller, R. J. (2007). Understanding recent trends in house prices and home ownership. Working Paper
13553, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Smith, M. H. and G. Smith (2006). Bubble, bubble, where’s the housing bubble? Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2006(1), 1–67.
Smither, J. W., M. London, N. L. Vasilopoulos, R. R. Reilly, R. E. Millsap, and N. Salvemini (1995). An
examination of the effects of an upward feedback program over time. Personnel Psychology 48(1),
1–34.
Staël vonHolstein, C.-A. S. (1972). Probabilistic forecasting:An experiment related to the stockmarket.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 8, 139–158.
van den Steen, E. (2004). Rational overoptimism (and other biases). American Economic Review 94(4),
1141–1151.
van den Steen, E. (2011). Overconfidence by Bayesian-rational agents. Management Science 57(5), 884–
896.
Steptoe, A. and H. Fidler (1987). Stage fright in orchestral musicians: A study of cognitive and be-
havioural strategies in performance anxiety. British Journal of Psychology 78(2), 241–249.
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review of Economic
Studies 23(3), 165–180.
Tomassini, L. A., I. Solomon, M. B. Romney, and J. L. Krogstad (1982). Calibration of auditors’ proba-
bilistic judgments: Some empirical evidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 30(3),
391–406.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Sci-
ence 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Walker, A. G. and J. W. Smither (1999). A five-year study of upward feedback: What managers do
with their results matters. Personnel Psychology 52(2), 393–423.
Welch, E. (1999). The heat of the moment. Working Paper.
33
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566464 
Appendix
N 0
1− pi pi
ϕ N
1
1
1 sˆ = ∅
1− ϕ
ϕ
sˆ = R
risky
safe a
GH
risky
safe a
GH
risky
safea
GL
θ = H
s = Rθ = L
s = ∅
N Nature 0 Self 0 1 Self 1
Figure 8: Extensive-form representation of intra-personal game.
Proof of Proposition 1. The belief pˆi(ϕe) is continuous and increasing in ϕe. There-
fore, the certainty equivalent cv(ϕe), which forms the upper bound of the integral in
D(ϕe), is continuous and decreasing in ϕe, varying between cv(0) = cLv and cv(1) =
cpiv , implying D(ϕe) is continuous in ϕe. The integrand in D(ϕe) is positive if and
only if a < cHu . The integral starts at cHv < cHu where the integrand is positive. Over
the interval of integration, the integrand decreases, turning negative if a increases
beyond cHu . Whether that happens depends on the upper bound cv(ϕe) ∈
[
cpiv , cLv
]
.
If cHu < cpiv then the integrand is negative at the upper bound for all ϕ. Reducing
the upper bound increases the integral so D is uniformly increasing. For cHu ↘ cHv ,
the interval
[
cHv , cHu
]
where the integrand is positive shrinks so D is negative for cHu
sufficiently close to cHv . This is low disagreement, self 0 never wants to make self
1 more confident, the only equilibrium is honesty, D(0) < 0. As cHu increases, D
remains increasing but can become positive. Then the mixed and the overconfidence
equilibria appear.
If cHu ∈
(
cpiv , cLv
)
, the integrand is negative at the upper bound for low ϕ (D in-
creasing) and positive at the upper bound for high ϕ (D decreasing) so D is inverse
U-shaped. At ϕ = 1, the upper bound is cpiv < cHu so the integrand is positive over the
entire integration. Therefore D(1) > 0, i.e. the honesty equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist.
If cHu > cLv , the integrand is always positive so the integral is always positive and
reducing the upper bound decreases the integral; so D is positive and decreasing
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everywhere. This is high disagreement, self 0 always wants to make self 1 more con-
fident, and the only possible equilibrium is overconfidence.
Note that D is increasing at the mixed equilibrium so the equilibrium is not “sta-
ble” in the following sense: for a small upward perturbation in self 1’s expected ϕe,
self 0 finds it optimal to increase ϕ further, until we reach the overconfidence equi-
librium ϕ = ϕe = 1 and vice versa for a small downward perturbation. 
Lemma 2. Consider two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions v1 and v2. If v2 is
more risk averse than v1, then Dv2(ϕe) > Dv1(ϕe) for all ϕe.
Proof of Lemma 2. If v2 is more risk averse than v1, then cHv2 < c
H
v1 and cv2(ϕ
e) <
cv1(ϕ
e) for all ϕe. This implies that for all ϕe,
Dv2(ϕ
e) =
∫ cv2 (ϕe)
cHv2
(
EH[δu(x)]− δu(a)
)
dF(a)
>
∫ cv1 (ϕe)
cHv1
(
EH[δu(x)]− δu(a)
)
dF(a)
= Dv1(ϕ
e) ,
as desired. 
Lemma 3. Consider two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions v1 and v2. If v2 is
more risk averse than v1 and if ϕ¯1 and ϕ¯2 exist such that Dv1(ϕ¯1) = 0 and Dv2(ϕ¯2) = 0,
then ϕ¯1 > ϕ¯2.
Proof of Lemma 3. If v2 is more risk averse than v1, then cHv2 < c
H
v1 by Lemma 1
so the integral in Dv2(ϕ¯2) has a smaller lower bound. Because EH[δu(x)]− δu(a) is
a strictly decreasing function of a, for Dv1(ϕ¯1) = Dv2(ϕ¯2) = 0, it is necessary that
cv2(ϕ¯2) > cv1(ϕ¯1), that is, that the integral in Dv2(ϕ¯2) must have a greater upper
bound. Because cv2(ϕ) < cv1(ϕ) for a given ϕ, and cv(ϕ) is decreasing in ϕ for v1
and v2, we have ϕ¯2 < ϕ¯1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For part 1, from Lemma 2 we know Dv2(1) > Dv1(1) for
v2 more risk averse than v1. Therefore, an overconfidence equilibrium exists for v2
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if it exists for v1. Again using Lemma 2, we know Dv2 (0) > Dv1 (0) for v2 more
risk averse than v1. Therefore, an honesty equilibrium exists for v1 if it exists for
v2. Finally, if a mixed equilibrium exists for v1 and v2, characterized by ϕ¯1 and ϕ¯2
respectively, then by Lemma 3, we have ϕ¯1 > ϕ¯2.
For part 2, note that pˆi(ϕe) is increasing in pi similarly as in ϕe, so analogously to
the proof of Proposition 1, we knowD(ϕe) is increasing in pi. Therefore, for higher pi,
the condition D(0) ≤ 0 for an honesty equilibrium is harder to satisfy, the condition
D(1) ≥ 0 for an overconfidence equilibrium is easier to satisfy, and any solution to
D(ϕ¯) = 0will be for a higher ϕ¯.
For part 3, note that adding a mean-preserving spread to the distribution GH has
the same effect on certainty equivalents as more disagreement between v and u, so
the arguments for part 1 apply analogously. 
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